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COMMENTS
has granted and protected the rights of employees and unions. Extending
such protection to its own employees will not result in any breakdown
of government. On the contrary, granting the public employee a voice
in the determination of the conditions under which he works will promote
better managerial techniques and make for more, not less, efficient govern-
ment.
Herbert Hoffman
EQUITY'S ROLE IN THE WAR ON ORGANIZED CRIME
The beast of organized crime is not a thing of the past. Nor is it
tamed. It remains a powerful foe with which we must be con-
cerned for many years to come.'
Organized crime is a cancerous threat to the entire fabric of American
society. Its tentacles reach out across the nation, seizing upon every
conceivable opportunity to expand its illicit operations. Through a myriad
of illegal activities the criminal organization is able to diffuse itself into
virtually every community; and though gambling, narcotics, prostitution
and loan-sharking are undoubtedly the most widely publicized of crime
syndicate ventures, they by no means exhaust the list. Like the giants of
commerce and industry, diversification is the key; and, as with these vast
corporate entities the financial yields are staggering. 2
One might well pause to reflect upon the effectiveness of society's
response. We have witnessed endless hearing upon hearing conducted by
both federal and state investigatory bodies, but the menace remains. There
has been legislation upon legislation, both proposed and enacted, yet the
enemy still does battle. Nor has the response been limited to the public
arena alone, for private organizations have answered the call as well.3
Though these efforts are, of course, to be commended, it is submitted that
the overall results to date have been minimal. Perhaps, then, in our zeal
to develop new and untried methods of attack, we have overlooked a
weapon which has long lain dormant-the inherent power of equity to
stem the advance of this enemy from within.
1 Kennedy, Proposals for Meeting the Challenge of Interstate Organized Crime, 38
NOTRE DAME LAW. 637, 640 (1963).
2 Hoover, The War on Organized Crime, 13 DE PAUL L. REv. 195 (1964); Hundley,
The Nature of Interstate Organized Crime and Problems in Law Enforcement, 38
NoTRE DAME LAW. 627 (1963); King, The Control of Organized Crime in America 4
STAN. L. REv. 52 (1961).
a Atypical among these are the Association of Attorneys General, the International
Association of Chiefs of Police, and the recently conceived National District Attor-
ney's Association discussed in Scott, Organized Law Enforcement v. Organized
Crime, 51 A.B.A. J. 932 (Oct. 1965).
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It is the purpose of this paper to examine the feasibility of such an
approach. In the course of this examination consideration will first be
given to determine whether there is existing within our framework of
jurisprudence a sound basis for the exercise of equitable jurisdiction.
Attention will then be directed to the practicalities involved in the
deployment of this weapon; and lastly, to meeting the objections which
would be likely to be invoked should this concept prove workable.
THE JURISDICTIONAL QUESTION
Basic to any sound understanding of equitable law enforcement is an
appreciation of our Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, with its
three-fold divisions into the criminal law, common law, and equity. As
to the nature of the latter, Professor Langdell has observed that, ironically,
equitable relief is based almost exclusively upon those measures of com-
pulsion and coercion which the common law, like numerous other sys-
tems, has rejected.4
It is in these attributes of compulsion and coercion that the value of
equitable law enforcement is manifested. Langdell aptly laid the founda-
tion for such deployment in his observation of the manner in which equity
accomplishes its purpose:
[T]he court first ascertains and decides what, if anything, the person com-
plained of ought to do or refrain from doing; then by its order or decree it
commands him to do or refrain from doing . . . and finally, if he refuses or
neglects to obey the order or decree, it punishes him by imprisonment for his
disobedience.5
Turning now to a consideration of equitable jurisdiction over criminal
acts, it has long been recognized that the Chancellor will neither under-
take to enforce the criminal law, nor will he enjoin the commission of a
crime as such.6 Though the foregoing statement indisputably represents
the status of the law today, it should be understood that this rule has not
always obtained. On the contrary, there is ample precedent to support
the view that during an earlier and more turbulent period of English
history, the Chancellor often invoked the strong arm of equity to restrain
the commission of public wrongs.7
4 Langdell, A Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction, 1 HARV. L. REv. 111 (1887).
5 Id. at 117.
6 Heber v. Portland Gold Mining Co., 64 Colo. 352, 172 Pac. 12 (1918); People v.
Prouty, 262 Ill. 218, 104 N.E. 387 (1914); Commonwealth v. Stratton Finance Co., 310
Mass. 469, 38 N.E.2d 640 (1941); People ex rel. Bennett v. Laman, 277 N.Y. 368, 14
N.E. 2d 439 (1938). See also 4 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE S 1347 (5th ed. 1941).
7. Maloney, Injunctive Law Enforcement: Leaven or Secret Weapon, 1 MERCER L.
REv. 1 (1949); 1 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE S 48 (1836).
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Such was the case in an early bill addressed to the Chancellor during
the last years of Richard 11,8 wherein the suppliant complained of a breach
of the King's Peace by one Roger de Wanderford, who:
[P]ut in wait many persons, unknown and of ill fame, collected and assembled
from divers parts, armed also with habergines, palettes, iron gloves, as well as
with plate and divers other armour [who] .. .against the peace of our Lord
The King... did ambush themselves to kill and murder the said suppliant.9
Blackstone, in commenting on bills of this nature, noted that mention
of this ancient practice could be found as early as the laws of Edward
The Confessor. 10 The rationale employed by the Chancellor in invoking his
jurisdiction was predicated upon the belief that the common law courts
were overawed by the power of local barons, and were thus unable to
provide an adequate remedy for breaches of the public peace." The
power of equity to entertain such causes unquestionably continued well
into the Tudor Era, but with the rise of the Star Chamber, its criminal
jurisdiction became gradually obsolete.12
Though the tyrannical usurpations of the Star Chamber ended with its
abolition in the reign of Charles I,1" chancery never ceased to protect
land or incorporeal heriditaments from irreparable injury-notwithstand-
ing the fact that the act complained of was also a crime. 14 The criminality
of a particular act thus came to be viewed as a neutral factor which
would neither confer jurisdiction nor oust what was otherwise valid.' 5
Chancery's jurisdiction over acts which possessed this sort of "dual
capacity" is most clearly seen in connection with the subject of public
nuisances. It should become readily apparent that within this fruitful area
8 1377-1399.
9 10 SELECT CASES IN CHANCERY (Selden Society) 5 (1397).
10 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES S 252 (3rd ed. 1768).
11 "No doubt the great majority of the cases in which relief was sought because of
failure of relief at law in the latter half of the fourteenth century were cases of out-
rage arising out of the state of civil war and lack of law enforcement which charac-
terized the period." WALSH, EQUITY 5 3 (1930).
12 Mack, The Revival of Criminal Equity, 16 HARV. L. REV. 389 (1903).
13 16 Car I c.10 (1640).
14 "A court of equit has no criminal jurisdiction, but it lends its assistance to a man
who has ... a right ofproperty, and ... makes out that an action at law will not be a
sufficient remedy .. ." Lord Mansfield in Macaulay v. Shackell. .1 Bligh N.S. 96,127, 4
Eng. Rep. 809, 820 (1827). Accord, United States v. American Bond & Mortgage Co.,
31 F.2d 448 (N.D. Il. 1929); Village of Spillertown v. Prewitt, 21 111. 2d 228, 171
N.E.2d 582 (1961); Burden v. Hoover, 9 Ill. 2d 114, 137 N.E.2d 59 (1956); People v.
City of St. Louis, 10 Ill. 351 (1848).
15 See Note, 28 FORDHAM L. REV. 161 (1959). Accord, In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564(1895); Allis Chalmers v. Reliable Lodge, 111 Fed. 264 (N.D. Ill. 1901); Cella v.
People, 112 IIl. App. 376 (1904).
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of the law, lies the genesis for the modern development of "criminal
equity." Although the concept of public nuisances may have well evolved
today to a point which renders it incapable of definition, at common law
they were considered to be:
[O]ffenses against the public, by either doing a thing which tends to the an-
noyance of all the King's subjects, or by neglecting to do a thing which the
common good requires x6
Clearly then, at common law the public nuisance was viewed as an
offense against society at large. The range of activities encompassed
within this broad category of public wrongs was significant even in
Blackstone's day. Included therein were purpestures, or interferences with
the King's highway, lotteries, offensive trades and manufacturers, eaves-
droppers, common scolds, and disorderly public places consisting of "dis-
orderly inns or ale houses, bawdy houses, ... stages for rope-dancers,
mountebanks and the like. '17
The manner of contending with these public wrongs has been as varied
as the range of activities themselves. In Coke's Reports it appears that
there were two recognized ways to address a nuisance in that day: (1)
by action, damages and removal; and (2) by self-help.' 8 Where the
nuisance was of the public variety, it was early established that the Crown
could proceed directly by indictment in King's Bench, 19 or, in excep-
tional cases, by an information brought by the Attorney General. 20 In-
junctive relief was obtainable as well, even during the reign of Elizabeth,
and though such wrongs were first enjoined in the Court of Exchequer, 21
Chancery's jurisdiction later became supreme. 22 In addition to the fore-
going, summary proceedings were later prescribed by statute, furnishing
the People with an additional remedy in certain specified instances. Typ-
ical among these are the provisions contained in the Illinois Nuisance Act
which provide for the enjoining and abatement of numerous public
nuisances including houses of prostitution,23 as well as narcotics establish-
ments.
24
16 2 RuSSELL, CRIMES 1691 (8th ed. 1923).
17 4 BLACKSTONE, op. cit. supra note 10, S 167.
18 Baten's Case, 9 Co. 53b, 77 Eng. Rep. 810 (K.B. 1609). See also James v. Hayward,
Cro. Car. 184, 79 Eng. Rep. 761 (K.B. 1631), wherein it was held that erecting a gate
across the highway constituted a public nuisance, and that any of the King's subjects
passing by might tear it down.
19 Rex. v. Medlor, 2 Show. K.B. 36, 89 Eng. Rep. 777 (K.B. 1677).
20 2 RUSSELL, CRIMES 1692 (8th ed. 1923).
21 Bond's Case, Moore 238, 72 Eng. Rep. 553 (Ex. 1587).
2 2 Mayor of London v. Bolt, 5 Ves. Jun. 129, 31 Eng. Rep. 507 (Ch. 1799); Coulson
v. White, 3 Atk. 21, 26 Eng. Rep. 816 (Ch. 1743).
28 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1001, § 1 (1965). 24 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 100i, § 15 (1965).
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It will be recalled that though the so-called "criminal jurisdiction" of
equity ceased with the advent and rise of the Star Chamber, the Chancel-
lor never ceased to invoke his jurisdiction where injury was threatened
to property.25 Justifiable concern over property rights led to an artificial
restriction upon equity's jurisdiction at an early date in this country.
The origins of this narrow interpretation are clearly viewed in the case
of Attorney General v. Utica Insurance Company,"6 where the State of
New York sought to restrain the business pursuits of an unincorporated
banking association, which were being carried on in violation of a penal
statute. In refusing the injunction the eminent Chancellor Kent declared:
If a charge be of a criminal nature, or an offense against the public, and does
not touch the enjoyment of property, it ought not to be brought within the
direct jurisdiction of this court .... It is an extremely rare case, and may be
considered, if it ever happened, as an anomaly, for a court of equity to inter-
fere at all, and much less, preliminarily, by injunction, to put down a public
nuisance which did not violate the rights of property, but only contravened
the general policy.27
While it is true that the earlier English authorities relied upon by the
Chancellor might superficially, at least, suggest this interpretation, upon
closer examination, the thesis appears to have little merit.28 The contention
that equity should extend its strong arm only where property rights were
concerned had been rejected unequivocally by Lord Hardwicke some
sixty-five years earlier when he recognized that in cases of public nuisance,
equitable jurisdiction was "not confined to the particular property of the
plaintiff, because it (a public nuisance) is in the nature of a terror to
diffuse itself in a very extensive manner. ' '29
Notwithstanding the criticism which issued as a result of the Chancel-
lor's holding,3 0 this decision admittedly did have considerable influence
on later American cases, and resulted, on occasion, in an unwillingness
by chancellors to enjoin as public nuisances situations which, though
violative of the public order, were absent of any vestiges of property
25 Supra note 14.
26 2 Johns. Ch. 371 (N.Y. 1817).
27 Id. at 378, 380.
28 A thorough analysis of the precedents cited by Chancellor Kent may be found in
State v. Mobile, 5 Porter 279 (Ala. 1837). See also Caldwell, Injunctions Against
Crime, 26 ILL. L. REv. 259 (1931).
29 Anon. 3 Atk. 750, 26 Eng. Rep. 1230 (Ch. 1752).
80 Supra note 28. Possibly the most absolute of rejections appears in State v. Craw-
ford, 28 Kan. 518, 524 (1882) where the court declared: "Now, with all due deference
to the vast learning and the eminent ability of the great chancellor, and with all proper
veneration for his memory and his name, we cannot follow this decision to its full and
entire extent; for, unquestionably, the great weight of authority, as well as of reason,
is against the doctrine seemingly enunciated therein."
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rights. 1 In such cases the courts were content to view the subject of
nuisances with this artificial and restricted gloss.
However, the growth and development of the public nuisance concept
was not to be retarded by such a narrow interpretation, for the cases
rejecting the property right requirement are legion. In order to promote
a better perspective it might be wise to consider these holdings in a
compartmentalized manner. In examining these cases it becomes readily
apparent that the underlying rationale for invoking jurisdiction is based
upon either the rights of the public at large or upon the inherent attri-
butes of sovereignty. In reality, though, these two groups overlap con-
siderably and thus the distinctions are oftentimes blurred.
Turning first to the public right theory, it is evident that in this ap-
proach the courts are referring to little more than the police power of
the states. In determining whether a public right has been invaded it is
not necessary that the entire community be touched; rather, it is sufficient
that the act complained of interferes with those who came into contact
with it in the exercise of common rights. Thus, where there are violations
of the public health,3 2 morals, 3 safety,34 and welfare,35 the courts will
ipso facto consider these as public wrongs and enjoinable as such.
Considering now those cases which predicate equitable jurisdiction
upon the presence of sovereign rights, the fundamental concept which
obtains is a clear recognition of the state as a juristic person. In the land-
mark case of In re Debs,36 an injunction was granted against the officers
of the American Railway Union commanding them to cease and desist
from boycotting the Pullman Car Company in Chicago. Following sub-
sequent violations of the injunction, the defendants were held in contempt
31Dean v. State, 151 Ga. 371, 106 S.E. 792 (1921); Sheridan v. Colvin, 78 111. 237
(1875); State ex rel. Wood v. Schweickardt, 109 Mo. 496, 19 S.W. 47 (1891).
32 People ex rel. Kerner v. Huls, 355 Il1. 412, 189 N.E. 346 (1934); refusal to submit
cattle for tuberculin test; Gay v. State, 90 Tenn. 645, 18 S.W. 260 (1891); keeping a
hogpen.
33 State ex rel. Sullivan v. Phoenix Say. Bank & Trust Co., 68 Ariz. 42, 198 P.2d 1018
(1948); illegal gambling; People ex rel. Thrasher v. Smith, 275 Ill. 256, 114 N.E. 31
(1916); maintaining a bawdy house; Stead v. Fortner, 255 111. 468, 99 N.E. 680 (1912);
operation of tavern in violation of antisaloon law; City of Aurora v. Warner Bros.
Picture Dist. Corp., 16 Ill. App. 2d 273, 147 N.E. 2d 694 (1958); obscene motion pic-
ture.
84 City of Chicago v. Larson, 31 111. App. 2d 450, 176 N.E.2d 675 (1961); refusal to
permit inspection of a multiresidential building; Commonwealth v. McGovern, 116
Ky. 212, 75 S.W. 261 (1903); holding of an illegal prize fight. King v. Kline, 6 Pa. 318
(1847); harboring a vicious animal. State ex rel. Crow v. Canty, 207 Mo. 439, 105 S.W.
1078 (1907); illegal bullfight.
35 State ex rel. Smith v. McMahon, 128 Kan. 772, 280 Pac. 906 (1929); Common-
wealth ex rel. Grauman v. Continental Co. 275 Ky. 238, 121 S.W. 2d 49 (1938); State
ex rel. Goff v. O'Neil, 205 Minn. 366, 286 N.W. 316 (1939); usurious practices.
86 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
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and imprisoned for a period of six months. In denying the prisoners'
petition for habeas corpus, the United States Supreme Court was singu-
larly impressed by the great public injury which was likely to ensue.
Though the Court hinted at the existence of the government's property
right in the mails, instead, it chose to bottom its decision upon the theory
that the exercise of such inherent attributes of sovereignty were basic to
the very existence of government.
The concept of sovereign rights became more deeply entrenched in the
years that followed Debs. In People v. Tool,37 the state sought to enjoin
certain election commissioners from engaging in a conspiracy which
would inevitably result in a "pollution of the ballot box." The court, in
granting the relief, recognized that the state, while acting in its sovereign
capacity as parens patriae, had the right to invoke the power of equity
to protect those citizens who were unable to act on their own behalf.
The court then proceeded to comment:
[W]hile the writ of injunction may not be employed to suppress a crime
as such, yet when the acts, though constituting a crime, will interfere with
liberties, rights, and privileges of citizens, the state not only has the right
to enjoin the commission of such acts, but it is its duty to do so.38
A similar line of reasoning was advanced by the California Supreme
Court in the case of In re Wood.3 9 There, the injunction had issued
against the Independent Workers of the World to enjoin threatened
violations of the Criminal Syndicalism Act. In rejecting the petitioners'
argument that the injunction was invalid, the court, in recognizing the
unique position of the state, declared "the government can obtain an
injunction to restrain a public nuisance without showing any property
right in itself. '40
Having traced the development of the public wrong concept to its
present expanded version, from the cases one may clearly discern a
marked trend toward greater liberality in affording equitable relief. The
broadening of the nuisance theory to include conduct which threatens
public rights as well as acts which infringe upon the inherent attributes
of sovereignty, has laid a sound basis for deployment of the injunctive
weapon yet one step further. Considering the present boundaries of our
chancery courts, it is submitted that it would be no drastic departure to
invoke equity's jurisdiction in those cases where a concert of action exists
by members of the criminal organization to defy the state or the public
at large. The propriety of this proposition is founded upon well estab-
lished precedents. The way is open; all that remains is a willingness to
wake a slumbering giant.
87 35 Colo. 225, 86 Pac. 224 (1905). 39 194 Cal. 49, 227 Pac. 908 (1924).
38 Id. at 237, 86 Pac. at 227. 40 Id. at 55, 27 Pac. at 910.
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PRACTICALITIES OF DEPLOYMENT
Having thus established that a sound jurisdictional basis for equitable
law enforcement does indeed exist through the public wrong channel, it
remains now to demonstrate that the injunction provides a practical solu-
tion to the threat of organized crime. In fashioning a workable theory,
one must bear in mind that the nature of the criminal organization is such
that alternative tactics are likely to be required to deal effective blows
against the several echelons of syndicate personnel. 41 What is likely to
be effective against those who art mere expendable troops, could well be
utterly unavailing when directed against the generals.
Considering first those at the lower rungs of the syndicate ladder, it is
clear that the strong arm of equity may be used to restrain such individ-
uals from engaging in acts which are encompassed in the expanded public
nuisance concept. Should they choose to ignore the order of the court,
summary punishment would be readily available after the contempt is
established. True, in jurisdictions such as Illinois this summary mode of
relief is available pursuant to statute; 4z but even under our Nuisance Act,
gambling operations escape completely the sanctions set forth therein.
Certainly here lies a fruitful area for deployment of the injunctive
weapons, and even though the individuals staffing such outposts will inev-
itably be but mere underlings in the criminal hierarchy, the impact will
be keenly felt. Disruptions in the day to day gambling activities would
impose economic sanctions by stopping the flow of illegal dollars, as well
as requiring manpower additions to replace those whose activities had
been enjoined.43
The management levels of organized crime, however, pose a different
sort of problem altogether-the problem of dealing with those individuals
who are physically far removed from the situs of illicit operations. If the
virtual immunity of the principals is to be negated, a theory must be
employed which will link these individuals with those activities sought
to be enjoined. Recognizing that any successful syndicate operation re-
quires a concert of action among those who seek to defy the state's
authority, the key to effective relief might very well lie in utilization of
the conspiracy concept. The great public injury would still constitute
the gravamen of the action,44 but by adding to it the conspiracy element,
an effective weapon would be on hand to bring to justice those who have
long been regarded as untouchable.
41 Johnson, Organized Crime: Challenge to the American Legal System. 53 J. CRIM.
L. 399 (1962).
42 Supra note 22. 48 Supra note 41.
44 Revert v. Hesse, 184 Cal. 295, 193 Pac. 943 (1920); Phelan v. Atlantic National
Bank of Boston, 301 Mass. 463, 17 N.E.2d 697 (1938); Roche v. Blair, 305 Mich. 608,
9 N.W.2d 861 (1943).
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To accomplish this result would involve a relatively simplified pro-
cedure. Once the Attorney General, State's Attorney, or other proper
public official has determined that sufficient grounds exist, a verified com-
plaint would be filed in chancery seeking injunctive relief against the
particular public wrong. In the case of gambling houses the complaint
would name not only the premises, but all who are suspected, even
minutely, of any connection with such illicit operations. A similar form
of complaint could be utilized against the juice racketeers, except here
there would be little likelihood of sighting in on any particular premises.
In any event, as long as specific facts are set out which constitute the
conspiracy, the complaint would not, in this writer's opinion, be open
to attack.45
Should the defendant fail to file an answer or any plea, the issuance of
a temporary injunction could be determined solely upon the sufficiency
of the complaint.46 It is well settled that an applicant for a temporary
injunction is not required to make out a case that in all events will entitle
him to ultimate relief; it is sufficient that the party seeking such relief
merely raise a fair question of the existence of such right.47 Furthermore,
in those jurisdictions which have verification requirements similar to that
contained in the Illinois Civil Practice Act,48 where the complaint is veri-
fied every subsequent pleading must be verified as well unless excused
by the court.49
Assuming, as is likely, that the defendant files his answer and a hearing
on the merits follows, this being a civil action, the plaintiff would be
required to prove his case by a mere preponderance of the evidence,
rather than beyond a reasonable doubt.50 Unlike a criminal proceeding
there would be no presumption of innocence to aid the offender, and the
law traditionally affords great latitude in the admission of circumstantial
evidence tending to establish a conspiracy.5'
Faced then with a less stringent burden of proof requirement, the state's
45 Mendenhall v. Stewart, 18 Ind. App. 262, 47 N.E. 943 (1897); Wells v. Houston,
23 Tex. Civ. App. 629, 57 S.W. 584 (1900).
4 6 Dunne v. County of Rock Island, 273 M. 53, 112 N.E. 342 (1916).
47 Nestor Johnson Mfg. Co. v. Goldblatt, 371 111. 570, 21 N.E.2d 723 (1939); Wein-
gart v. Weingart, 23 111. App. 2d 154, 161 N.E.2d 714 (1959).
4 8 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 35 (1965).
49 Capital Records, Inc. v. Vee Jay Records, Inc., 47 11. App. 2d 468, 197 N.E. 2d
503 (1964).
50 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2498 (3rd ed. 1940). See also, State v. Froelich, 316 Ill. 77,
146 N.E. 733 (1925); Chase v. Proprietors of Revere House, 232 Mass. 88, 122 N.E. 162
(1919).
51 Clune v. United States, 159 U.S. 590 (1895); United States v. General Electric Co.,
82 F. Supp. 753 (D. N. J. 1949); Rent-a-Car Co. v. Globe and Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. 161
Md. 249, 156 At. 847 (1931).
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prospects of obtaining the desired relief would be greatly enhanced.
Where proceeding, for example, against a house of prostitution, the gen-
eral reputation of the establishment as a house of ill fame is sufficient to
warrant the issuance of the injunction. Specific acts of lewdness or prosti-
tution need not be introduced by the People.52 In proving the conspiracy
element the state would be aided considerably by the rule which allows
admissions of co-conspirators to be used against each other.53 Tangible
evidence such as books, records, etc., might be obtained through ordinary
discovery methods,54 and their production could not be thwarted by a
reliance upon the fifth amendment, except in certain restricted circum-
stances. 55
The speed with which the injunctive weapon may issue would serve to
cause no small degree of apprehension in the hearts of the offenders. There
would, of course, be no expectation of a prolonged jury trial, nor would
there be any protection forthcoming from those constitutional provisions
which apply to criminal prosecutions.56 Should the injunction fail to deter
the defendants from engaging in the conduct proscribed, contempt pro-
ceedings would be commenced. Since the contempt would be founded
upon the defendant's refusal to obey the lawful command of the Chancel-
lor it would be of a civil nature.57 Thus, this second stage would be absent
as well as any requirement of jury trial,58 or proof of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.59
From the foregoing analysis it may be seen that the Chancellor is placed
in the rather unique position of being able to distribute preventative
justice by enjoining threatened acts, as well as those currently in progress.
As the able justice Story once observed: "[B]y a perpetual injunction the
remedy is made complete through all future time. . . .,0 To accomplish
this result would require only that certain illicit acts be approached as
52 Balch v. State, 65 Okla. 146, 164 Pac. 776 (1917).
53 4 WGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1079 (3rd ed. 1940). See also United States v. Lev, 276
F.2d 605 (2nd Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 812 (1961).
54 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, S 101.17 (1965).
55 Though the privilege against self-incrimination would apply where an individual
is required to produce records which incriminate him, the privilege would not likely
extend to the other representatives of a collective group. 8 WIGMORu, EVIDENCE
§ 2259(b) (3rd ed. 1940).
56 See Black, The Expansion of Criminal Equity Under Prohibition. 5 Wisc. L. REv.
412 (1930), wherein the author lists six federal constitutional guarantees, in addition
to the right of trial by jury, which are bypassed through the deployment of "crimi-
nal equity."
57 Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966). 58 Ibid.
59 People ex. rel. Hook v. Buconich, 277 I11. 290, 115 N.E. 185 (1917).
60 2 STORY, EQUrTY JURISPRUDENCE 5 924 (1836).
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public nuisances rather than as crimes. The tactical change suggested ap-
pears to be amply justified in light of the potential yield. The weapon is
ready and available; all that is needed is a willingness to use it.
MEETING THE OBJECTIONS LIKELY TO ENSUE
Since objections to the deployment of the injunctive weapon would be
legion, the remaining section of this paper will be devoted to meeting the
criticism likely to develop from its use. Considering first those objections
which might be viewed as jurisdictional in nature, some will no doubt
voice alarm in what has been labelled a revival of "the ancient grudge be-
tveen Coke, the common law incarnate, and Ellesmere, the Keeper of the
King's Conscience."' The argument will be advanced that the expansion
of the public nuisance concept constitutes an unwarranted intrusion into
the area of criminal law.62 In reply to this sort of objection, it will be re-
called that in the first section of this paper, the jurisdictional foundations
were clearly laid, with care taken to show that in the case of public
wrongs the criminality of a particular act has achieved a neutral status.
Therefore, the argument has little merit; for to permit this neutrality to
oust jurisdiction which is otherwise valid, surely seems as objectionable as
allowing it to confer jurisdiction.
The contention will also be made that traditionally equity does not be-
come embroiled in matters of this nature, and that its well recognized
boundaries must be respected. Objections of this sort have their origin in
the rather static interpretation of equity announced nearly a century and
a half ago by Lord Eldon, when he declared:
The doctrines of this Court ought to be as well settled and made as uniform
almost as those of the common law, laying down fixed principles, but taking
care that they are to be applied according to the circumstances of the case.63
The question thus arises as to whether equity should be bound rigidly
by a strict adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis, or allowed to develop
new remedies to meet the demands of a society far removed from the
England of Lord Eldon's day. When equity is viewed in its proper per-
spective it is difficult indeed to ignore its historical justification which
looked to the chancery as a means of alleviating the rigidity and technicali-
ties inherent in the common law. Certainly, the day for making precedents
has not passed; for were this to be so, the value of equity would be more
imagined than real.
61 Supra note 56, at 412.
62 In Simpson, Fifty Years of American Equity, 50 HARV. L. REv. 171, 228 (1936),
the author criticized what he interprets as "a spurious expansion of the public nuisance
concept. .. ." See also, Hedden v. Hand, 90 N.J.Eq. 583, 107 Atl. 285 (1919).
63 Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swans. 302, 414, 36 Eng. Rep. 670, 674 (Ch. 1818).
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Is this to suggest then, that equity's jurisdiction knows no bounds other
than the Chancellor's subjective interpretations of the jus naturale? Not-
withstanding that propositions of this sort have been regarded as bordering
upon blasphemy by commentators such as Story,6 4 support for this thesis
may be found in no less an authority than the esteemed Professor Chafee.6
It is the contention of Chafee that equity jurisdiction is not truly jurisdic-
tional in nature, but is merely a conglomeration of self-imposed rules
which should be treated merely as reasons for coming into equity-and
nothing more. In arriving at this conclusion heavy emphasis is placed upon
the "single court theory" wherein the merger of law and equity is viewed
as obliterating the historical jurisdictional distinctions between Chancery
and King's Bench. Regarding the separate court of chancery as "extinct as
the separate estate of a married woman," 66 Chafee argues that an en-
lightened judge should:
[A]bandon the notion that the two sides of Westminster Hall survive in his
courtroom. It is like saying that he has power to decide the dispute when he
crosses his left leg over his right, and no power at all when his right leg is
on top. Either the court has power or it does not; and if it has power it has
it all day long, regardless of the label put on the particular suit.67
Though the learned professor is quick to admit that his position is clear-
ly opposed to distinguished authority, he is able to formulate a cogent
argument in support of his stand. This is best seen in his analysis of the
traditionally accepted rule that equitable jurisdiction will not obtain where
the aggrieved party may secure an adequate remedy at law. Chafee force-
fully contends that an examination of the authorities points to no instance
where the adequacy of a legal remedy was held to make a decree for
equitable relief void on collateral attack.68 The conclusion reached is that
as long as the court has jurisdiction of the subject matter and over the
parties, nothing further is required.
Admittedly, the Chafee thesis represents the minority view and would
64 "If, indeed, a Court of Equity in England did possess the unbounded jurisdiction,
which has been thus generally ascribed to it . .. freeing itself from all regard to former
rules and precedents, it would be the most gigantic in its sway, and the most formi-
dable instrument of arbitrary power, that could well be devised." 1 STORY, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE S 19 (1836).
65 CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 296-380 (1950). The material to which refer-
ence is made was originally delivered by the professor in conjunction with the
Thomas M. Cooley Lectures at the University of Michigan Law School. Additional
support for this thesis may be found in CLAR, EQUITY § 8 (1919).
66 CHAFEE, Op. cit. supra note 65, at 306. 67 1d. at 339.
6s Support for this proposition is found in Stout v. Cook, 41 Ill. 447 (1866), where
the court held that failure to raise the adequacy of legal remedy objection at the on-
set, resulted in a waiver.
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be most unpalatable among those who subscribe to the traditionalist
school. It should be understood, however, that one need not embrace this
extreme position in order to disarm the jurisdictional arguments. On the
contrary, such attacks may be met even where the absence of an adequate
remedy at law is viewed as the ultimate test of equity jurisdiction.
Satisfaction of the inadequate remedy at law requirement may be easily
accomplished through several alternate channels. One avenue available to
the People is the persistent offender doctrine which capitalizes upon the
defendant's continued defiance of the law. This theory was employed by
the state in People ex rel Dyer v. Clark,69 where the defendant had been
convicted and fined on numerous occasions for the maintenance of a
bawdyhouse. Recognizing that the defendant's illicit callings would con-
tinue indefinitely upon mere payment of a token fine, it was held that no
effective remedy at law existed. The Illinois Supreme Court poignantly
expressed its opinion of constant offenders in the later case of People ex rel
Kerner v. Hulls,70 wherein the state sought injunctive relief against a rc-
calcitrant farmer who repeatedly refused to submit his cattle for manda-
tory tuberculin tests. Unimpressed by the availability of criminal sanc-
tions, the court said:
This court has never regarded a criminal prosecution which cannot prevent
the continuance of a nuisance as a complete and adequate remedy for a wrong
inflicted on the people.71
The absence of an adequate legal remedy might secondly be established
upon a showing that a multiplicity of suits would be required at law in
the event equity's jurisdiction did not obtain. This theory found accept-
ance by the Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.72
In this case the defendant corporation had urged its numerous retail out-
lets and subsidiaries to engage in wilful violation of a statute which pro-
hibited unlicensed sales of drugs and patent medicines. In awarding injunc-
tive relief the court advanced the proposition that an adequate legal
remedy could hardly be said to exist where upwards of two-hundred
separate actions would be necessary to enforce this public health measure.
Finally, the third available approach is centered in the irreparable
damage theory which puts in issue the likelihood of imminent public in-
jury "before the tardiness of the law could reach it.''T3 Utilization of this
theory was successfully made by the Attorney General in United States v.
69 268 111 156, 108 N.E. 994 (1915).
70 355 TH. 412, 189 N.E. 346 (1934).
7 1 Id. at 417, 189 N.E. at 349.
72 253 Minn. 236, 92 N.W.2d. 103 (1958).
78 City of Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co., 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 91, 98 (1838).
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American Bond & Mortgage Co. 74 Here, an injunction issued to restrain
the defendant from making unlicensed radio broadcasts. The court in this
case was understandably impressed by the fact that the long arm of justice
would not attach until the mischief had long been accomplished.
In concluding this matter of adequate legal remedy, it should be under-
stood that this jurisdictional test is not at all synonymous with the prob-
lem of inadequate modes of law enforcement. Specifically, it has been held
to be of no jurisdictional consequence that local authorities refuse to en-
force the law;75 that local juries fail to convict;70 or that criminal courts
do not seek to impose heavy penalties. 77
A second possible ground of objection concerns the effectiveness of
equitable relief in relation to the evil we seek to abate. It has been sug-
gested that the injunctive weapon provides no additional sanction in that
the criminal law already forbids the identical act which forms the basis for
the intervention of equity.78 This nearsighted approach overlooks the fact
that through the injunction a personal message is conveyed to the
offender. Whereas the criminal law as such addresses itself to all of society,
the injunction singles out the defendant and speaks in unmistakable terms
to him alone.
The third group of objections is most clearly viewed in reference to
those constitutional and procedural safeguards which traditionally afford
protection to the criminally accused. The charge no doubt would be made
that the expansion of equity's jurisdiction serves to further erode our
cherished rights of jury trial. Hopefully, this question was answered
above;79 but, in the event any doubts remain, it should be emphasized
once again that the constitutional right of trial by jury does not extend to
matters which are cognizable in chancery. s0
Considering now the matter of punishment, admittedly the spectre of
double punishment is no bogeyman. It is entirely within the realm of pos-
74 31 F.2d 448 (N.D. 111. 1929).
75 State v. O'Leary, 155 Ind. 526, 58 N.E. 703 (1900); Powers v. Flansburg, 90 Neb.
467, 133 N.W. 844 (1911); Vera v. Robinson, 16 S.W. 2d 860 (Tex. 1929). A contra
view obtains in Illinois where "if ordinary methods are ineffective or officials disregard
their duties and refuse to perform them, the court ought to apply the strong and
efficient hand of equity and uproot the evil." Stead v. Fortner, 255 Ill. 468, 479, 99 N.E.
680, 684 (1912).
76 People ex rel. Bennett v. Laman, 277 N.Y. 368, 14 N.E.2d 439 (1938).
77 Attorney General v. Harris, (1959) 2 All E.R. 393 (Ch.).
786 B.U.L. REv. 128, 131 (1926). 7OSupra notes 56 and 58.
80 "A man charged with the commission of a crime has a constitutional right to a
trial by jury, but a man who has not yet acted, but who merely proposes to commit
an act which is not only criminal in its character, but also flagrantly offensive as a
public nuisance, has no constitutional right to commit the act in order that he may
thereafter enjoy the constitutional right of trial by jury." State ex rel. Crow v. Canty,
207 Mo. 439, 460, 105 S.W. 1078, 1085 (1907).
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sibility that an indictment will follow close upon the punishment for con-
tempt. Should a conviction result in the criminal proceeding no violence
would be done to the double jeopardy provisions of the Constitution.s'
Conversely, if the People had proceeded in the first instance by indict-
ment, an acquittal would not justify a subsequent plea of res judicata. s2
Though the threat of double punishment may tend to make some wary of
the injunctive weapon, it should be recognized that within the traditional
framework of our common law system the same threat has been ever pres-
ent. One need only to consider the crime of battery-taking notice, of
course, of the civil implications as well. Double punishment, so to speak,
has long been imposed here, for an award in damages will scarcely bar the
state from invoking the aid of the criminal courts.
The final objection warranting mention is the apprehension among sin-
cere libertarians, that if equity were to move more energetically into the
public nuisance field, the ominous threat of government by injunction
would be ever present. Such was the fear of Chancellor Kent nearly one
hundred and fifty years ago, when, in refusing to grant equitable relief, he
said of the injunction:
It is the strong arm of the court; and to render its operation benign and useful,
it must be exercised with great discretion, and when necessity requires it.sa
Understandably, there is considerable merit in arguments of this sort.
Restraint is oftentimes necessary lest the pendulum swing back to the
England which existed in the era of the Star Chamber. At the same time,
however, it is equally objectionable to dismiss in a cavalier manner, the
unique nature of the menace which threatens from within.
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing it its apparent that it is a balance for which we
must aim. A balance which not only respects the rights of individuals, but
recognizes the rights of society as well. Perhaps the time has come to
reverse a pendulum which has "swung too far in favor of affording rights
which are abused and misused by criminals. ' '8 4 Not, surely back to the day
of the Tudors, but perhaps just far enough to insure that a healthy equilib-
rium be maintained. The People are in desperate need of a new weapon to
do effective battle against organized crime. The injunction could well be
the answer.
Michael P. Toomin
81 Lewinsohn v. United States, 278 Fed. 421 (7th Cir. 1921); Ex parte Allison, 99
Tex. 455, 90 S.W. 870 (1906).
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